A shell factory in Texas has produced zero parts in two years, while a new executive order tries to fix the deeper problem: America’s weapons still depend on materials from its rivals
The United States is trying to fix its defence industrial base from two directions at once, and the gap between the two efforts tells its own story. On one side, Washington has just tightened the rules governing where defence contractors can source critical materials, aiming to cut dependence on foreign, and often rival, suppliers. On the other side sits a $469 million ammunition plant in Mesquite, Texas, that was supposed to help solve America’s shell shortage and has, after more than two years, produced nothing at all, according to a media report on a new Pentagon inspector general finding. Together, the two stories describe a defence industrial base that is being reshaped by real urgency, and is still struggling to deliver.
A factory built for shells that never arrived
The General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems facility opened in May 2024 with considerable fanfare, built specifically to produce 30,000 metal parts a month for 155mm artillery shells. More than two years later, it has not delivered a single projectile part that met the Pentagon’s specifications, according to the inspector general’s report.
The shortfall matters because of how badly the US military needs these shells. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, American forces have seen their stockpile of 155mm rounds depleted by roughly 3.6 million rounds, more than 3 million of them sent to Ukraine as military aid, with another 112,000 used in training and testing and 218,000 sold to allies and partners, the report found. The war has repeatedly resembled an artillery slugging match reminiscent of the First World War, a conflict that, ironically, produced its own shell crisis in Britain in 1915 severe enough to help bring down a sitting prime minister.
Washington tried to respond by ramping up shell production from just 14,000 rounds a month in 2023 to a target of 100,000 by October 2025. That deadline has come and gone. As of March 2026, the Army had reached only 36,000 shells a month, well short of target, and much of the blame lands squarely on Mesquite’s empty production line. With only three facilities currently producing the necessary metal parts, the Department of Defence will reach just 71,000 rounds a month, or 71 per cent of its production goal, the inspector general warned.
The report recommends the Army identify a real fix, review the Mesquite contract itself, determine how the $469 million was actually spent, and assess whether any of it can be recovered, along with questioning whether the contract was properly issued in the first place. Some progress is underway elsewhere; a new facility in Parsons, Kansas, opened in April through a partnership between the Army and ammunition maker Day & Zimmermann, dedicated to producing the M795 fragmentation round, alongside an expanded load, assemble and pack facility opened last year in Camden, Arkansas.
Part of the problem is simply how difficult these shells are to manufacture at scale. Each 155mm round, roughly 60 centimetres long and weighing about 45 kilograms, is built from four components: a detonating fuse, projectile, propellant and primer, produced using massive hydraulic forge presses, specialised CNC lathes and precise thermal treatment equipment. Much of the industrial base’s tooling is old, and new manufacturing lines require equipment that is both heavily calibrated and largely untested at the volumes now being demanded.
Washington tries to fix the deeper vulnerability, where the materials come from
While the Mesquite plant sits idle, a separate and broader effort is underway to address a different weakness in the same industrial base, dependence on materials sourced from strategic rivals. A new executive order tightening waiver rules for defence supply chains marks one of Washington’s strongest moves yet to reduce reliance on foreign-sourced materials and strengthen the resilience of the US military industrial base, according to media reports.
The order significantly raises the bar for contractors seeking waivers to purchase critical minerals and other restricted materials from prohibited foreign suppliers. Companies must now demonstrate they have exhausted alternative sources, disclose where key materials actually originate, and present detailed plans for removing non-compliant suppliers from their networks. Contractors that fail to meet these standards risk procurement penalties or losing future contract opportunities entirely.
The move reflects a genuine and growing concern that the United States remains exposed to supply chain disruption in the event of a major conflict. Recent assessments indicate that many advanced military systems still depend on minerals and components processed or manufactured in countries Washington considers strategic competitors, China chief among them, materials essential to missiles, combat aircraft, naval systems and electronic equipment.
The order reaches further than waivers alone. It directs the Department of Defence to map supply chains from raw material all the way to finished weapon, identify hidden vulnerabilities along the way, and require contractors to assess their suppliers for foreign ownership, financial risk and manufacturing resilience. Security analysts suggest this mapping exercise will give military planners a far clearer picture of where production could break down during an actual crisis, precisely the kind of blind spot that let Mesquite sit idle for two years without triggering an earlier reckoning.
Two different vulnerabilities, one shared root cause
This effort builds on years of accumulating concern over the health of America’s defence industrial base. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed just how quickly modern warfare consumes missiles, artillery ammunition and precision weapons, while rising tensions with China have added pressure on Washington to ensure key military production cannot be interrupted by export restrictions or geopolitical disputes.
Critical minerals sit at the centre of this debate. Rare earth elements and other specialised materials go into radar systems, guidance equipment, electric motors and advanced electronics, and according to Western officials, reducing dependence on overseas processing has become just as important as expanding weapons production itself.
The policy will likely reshape how defence manufacturing actually operates. Companies may face higher compliance costs as they qualify new suppliers and redesign procurement networks from scratch, and smaller firms could face additional administrative burden, though the executive order directs regulators to avoid placing unnecessary strain on new market entrants specifically.
Military planners increasingly treat resilient supply chains as a matter of battlefield readiness rather than simply an industrial or economic concern. A modern fighter jet or missile system can depend on thousands of suppliers spread across multiple countries, and a shortage of even one specialised component can delay production and weaken operational readiness, exactly the dynamic that has kept the Mesquite facility from delivering a single usable part despite two years and hundreds of millions of dollars in investment.
The order also signals that allied nations may play a larger role in future defence manufacturing. Domestic sourcing remains the stated priority, but trusted international suppliers are expected to take on more responsibility as Washington tries to diversify away from geopolitical rivals without slowing production in the process.
What connects a broken ammunition plant in Texas to a sweeping executive order on mineral sourcing is a single underlying question: whether America’s defence industrial base can actually deliver at the scale modern conflict demands, regardless of how well designed the policy on paper looks. Defence contractors will now need to show they can secure alternative material sources while still meeting production schedules for the Pentagon and allied customers. Whether tighter sourcing rules actually strengthen resilience without slowing weapons output even further will be a defining test of America’s long-term defence strategy, one that the empty production line in Mesquite suggests Washington cannot afford to get wrong twice.
